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Comment on ”Quantum Key Distribution in the Holevo
Limit”
In a Letter, Cabello [1] proposed a quantum key distribution
(QKD) Protocol which attended to Holevo limit. He assumed
that the quantum channel is composed of two qubits (1 and 2),
and is prepared with equal probabilities in one of four orthog-
onal pure states |ψi〉 (i = 0, 1, 2, 3), and that Eve cannot have
access to qubit 2 while she still holds the qubit 1. He con-
siders the following states (for simplicity, we have replaced
polarization states with spin states)
|ψ0〉 = |00〉12 |ψ1〉 =
1√
2
[|10〉12 + |01〉12]
|ψ2〉 =
1√
2
[|10〉12 − |01〉12] |ψ3〉 = |11〉12 (1)
We use the states |0〉 and |1〉 to represent spin up and spin
down respectively. The efficiency of a QKD protocol, E, is
defined as [1]:
E =
bs
qt + bt
, (2)
where bs is the expected number of secret bits received by
Bob, qt is the number of qubits used in the quantum channel,
and bt is the number of bits used in the classical channel be-
tween Alice and Bob. In Cabllo’s scheme bt = 0 and qs = qt,
which leads to E = 1 (the Holevo limit). Cabello’s proto-
col (CP) has some basic properties: (a) CP uses all of Hilbert
space dimensions, (b) He has defined an interesting criterion
for the efficiency of QKD protocols, (c) He avoids using clas-
sical channel.
Eve could use a simple plan to distinguish between (ψ0, ψ3)
and (ψ1, ψ2), without being detected by Alice and Bob. In
other words, the set of four states are now partitioned into two
sets. To show this, we assume Eve’s particle to be in the state
|0〉e. When the qubit 1 passes through the first channel, she
applies a CNOT operation on the qubit 1, as the control qubit,
and her own particle, as the target. Then, she lets the qubit
1 goes to Bob’s system. When she receives the qubit 2, she
does the same operation on it and on her own qubit. After this
operations, we have:
|ψi〉|0〉e −→ |ψi〉|0〉e i = 0, 3
|ψi〉|0〉e −→ |ψi〉|1〉e i = 1, 2 (3)
At this stage, there is a trick by which Eve can distinguish ex-
actly between two of the four states [2]. After the application
of the second CNOT, she makes a measurement on her own
particle in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis. If she gets |1〉, she would let
the qubit 2 go to Bob’s system. Otherwise, by a measurement
on the qubit 2 in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis, she could understand
whether the state of Alice and Bob is |00〉 or |11〉. This means
that an undetectable Eve can know Alice’s encoding whenever
Alice uses the basis (ψ0, ψ3), making the CP insecure.
In the BB84 [3] protocol, security is guaranteed by the no-
cloning theorem in the non-orthogonal states. CP was founded
on the no-cloning principle for orthogonal states, which was
suggested by T. Mor [4]. He proposed that the two (or more)
orthogonal states cannot be cloned, if the reduced density
matrices of the first subsystem are non-orthogonal and non-
identical and the reduced density matrices of the second sub-
system are non-orthogonal. Here a basic question is whether
no-cloning condition for non-orthogonal and orthogonal states
is sufficient to have the security of QKD protocol? With at-
tention to our Eavesdropping approach, it seems that Mor’s
arguments for no-cloning principal for orthogonal states [4] is
not general enough to avoid eavesdropping. In what follows,
we would like to show that our approach is not restricted to
CP. For example, we consider two non-maximally entangled
states as follows:
|ψ〉 = cosα|0〉1|1〉2 + sinα|1〉1|0〉2
|φ〉 = cosβ|0〉1|0〉2 + sinβ|1〉1|1〉2
with 0 < α, β < π/2 and α 6= β 6= π/4. The re-
duce density matrices for the first subsystems are: ρ1ψ =
cos2 α|0〉〈0|+sin2 α|1〉〈1|, ̺1φ = cos
2 β|0〉〈0|+sin2 β|1〉〈1|.
These reduced density matrices are neither orthogonal nor
identical, and so they could’t be cloned, and the reduced den-
sity matrices for second subsystems are: ρ2ψ = cos2 α|1〉〈1|+
sin2 α|0〉〈0|, ̺2φ = cos
2 β|0〉〈0|+sin2 β|1〉〈1|. These reduced
density matrices are not orthogonal to each other, but this pro-
tocol is not secured completely against a double CNOT opera-
tions.
Here are some questions: What are the defects in the Mor
proposal? How Mor proposal can be repaired? In another
paper in progress, we respond to these questions.
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